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RES JUDICATA AND THE CONTINUING CAUSE
OF ACTION: A NEW PITFALL FOR THE
PRIVATE ANTITRUST PLAINTIFF*
THE doctrine of res judicata I bars subsequent litigation of any part of a
"cause of action" which has once proceeded to j'dgment on the merits.-
Where the prior action was founded upon a single transaction or occur-
rence, a later suit alleging similar transactions or occurrences subsequent to
judgment is clearly not based upon the original cause of action.8 However,
a private antitrust action 4 is often founded upon a course of business con-
*Lavlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 211 F.2d 934 (3d Cir.), affirmlng 1953
TRADE CAS. U 67,619 (E.D. Pa. 1953), cert. granted, 75 Sup. Ct. 42 (1954).
1. The term "res judicata" is used in this Note as in 1. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAC'TIC
§ 2.044 (Cum. Supp. 1942), exclusively to denote the effect of a judgment on the merits
as an absolute bar to subsequent litigation between the same parties, or those in privity
with them, upon the same claim or demand. The term "collateral estoppel" is used to
denote the conclusive effect of a judgment upon" issues of fact, or mixed fact and law,
actually litigated and necessarily determined by the court, called "estoppel by judgment"
by Moore. Ibid.
The terminology of the law of judgments has been chaotic. "Res judicata" as defined
above includes the effects of a judgment sometimes referred to as "bar," "merger," and
"the rule against splitting a cause of action." For definitions of these terms see RESTATE-
MENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 47, 48, 62 (1942). But "res judicata" is sometimes used as a
broad generic term for all the conclusive effects of a judgment, encompassing both the
above concepts and "collateral estoppel." Id. at 160; Developments in the Law--Res
Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REv. 818, 820 n.1 (1952).
"Collateral estoppel" as defined above is synonymous with the terms "estoppel by
judgment," "estoppel by record," and "estoppel by verdict," as ordinarily used. See 1
MOORE, op. cit. supra, at 115 n.3a; BIGELOW, ESTOPPEL 27 (2d ed. 1876); Millar, The
Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res Judicata, 35 ILL. L. REv. 41 (1940).
2. Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191 (1932) ; Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316
(1927); Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 186 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 921 (1951). See also 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS §§ 546, 676 (5th
ed. 1925); 1 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2.044; RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 47, 48,
62 (1942).
In order to be effective as res judicata, a judgment must be valid, ibid., and final,
id. § 1, comments c, d, & § 41. Judgments are binding only upon the parties to the
action, and persons in privity with them. See 1 MOORE, op. cit. supra, § 2.046; RESTATE-
MNENT, JUDGMENTS c. 4 (1.942).
3. See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §61, comment c (1942). Joinder of claims based
on a series of similar transactions or occurrences occurring prior to judgment may,
however, be required. See, e.g., Kelly v. Cape Girardeau, 338 Mo. 103, 89 S.W.2d 41
(1935) (recurrent floodings).
4. Suits for treble damages by persons injured in business or property "by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws," are authorized by § 4 of the Clayton Act,
38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952), superseding similar provisions in the Sher-
man Act, 26 STAT. 210 (1890). Private suits for injunction are authorized by Clayton
Act § 16,38 STAT. 73 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1952).
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duct pursued over a period of years.5 When such a suit has once gone to
judgment, a problem has recently arisen as to whether a subsequent action
alleging a continuation of the same course of conduct is based upon the
original cause of action and is therefore barred by the prior judgment.0
Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp.7 held that a prior judgment
barred a private antitrust suit based upon continuation of the same course
of conduct previously at issue. Lawlor, a local distributor of motion picture
advertising accessories,8 had brought an action in 1942 for treble damages
and an injunction against three motion picture producers and National
Screen, a nationwide distributor.0 The complaint charged that the defendants
5. Most violations of the Sherman Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1S90), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3
(1952), such as adherence to contracts in restraint of trade, combination, conspiracy, and
monopolization, are continuing crimes rather than a series of distinct offenses. See
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 342 (1897) ; United States
v. Swift, 186 Fed. 1002 (N.D. IlL 1911); cf. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. TeMs, 212 U.S.
86, 107-8 (1909). The criminal statute of limitations does not begin to run on a con-
spiracy so long as the illegal design has not been abandoned or concluded. United States
v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608 (1910).
The continuing nature of private antitrust causes of action has plagued the courts in
connection with civil statutes of limitations, which ordinarily begin to run when the
cause of action "accrues." See, generally, Wilson, Origin and Linilcd Life of the Anti-
trust Cause of Action, 21 K-ax. Crr L. REv. 127 (1953).
6. The effect of prior litigation has seldom been an issue in private antitrust cases.
Until recently there had been only a negligible number of such suits. See Comment, 61
YALE L.J. 1010, 1011 (1952).
Van Brode Milling Co. v. Kellogg Co., 113 F. Supp. 845 (D. Del. 1953), held that dis-
missal of an antitrust counter-claim for failure of prosecution vas no bar to a subsequent
action alleging later conduct of a similar type. But see United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 51 F. Supp. 613, 622 (D.D.C. 1943) (dictum). See also 103 U. PA. L Ray.
273 (1954).
The extent to which judgment bars subsequent civil actions by the government is by
no means clear. Although successive actions involving the same or similar issues have
often been brought by the government, res judicata has rarely been urged as a defense.
See cases cited in Black, Res Jigdicata and Conspiracy Cases under the Shcrtnan Act, 30 Ky.
L.J. 255, 255 n.1, 256 n.2 (1942). Moreover, res judicata has been applied less stringently to
the federal government than to private plaintiffs. Compare FTC v. Motion Picture Ad-
vertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1953), with Williamson v. Columbia Gas &
Electric Corp., 186 F.2d 464, 468 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 921 (1951). Even
if res judicata were upheld, the government would not be precluded from bringing a criminal
action. Civil judgments have no res judicata effect in criminal actions, and vice versa. 1
MooR,, FEDERAL PRAcrzcE § 2.047 (Cum. Supp. 1942). Collateral estoppel applies, how-
ever, and might defeat a subsequent civil or criminal action. Ibid.; Lugar, Criminal Law,
Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39 IowA L. REV. 317 (1954).
7. 211 F.2d 934 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 75 Sup. Ct. 42 (1954).
8. Lawlor distributed only "standard" accessories, such as photographs and posters,
used for display advertising in theatres. Id. at 935; Brief for Appellants, pp. 2-3, Lawhar
v. National Screen Service Corp., 211 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1954).
9. Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 211 F.2d 934, 935 (3d Cir. 1954).
National Screen, in addition to distributing "standard" accessories, distributed film
trailers and "specialty" accessories. Ibid.
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had conspired since 1940 to monopolize the national market in copyrighted
motion picture advertising accessories by means of exclusive distribution
licenses.' 0 This suit was settled in 1943.11 Lawlor executed a general re-
lease,' 2 and received in return a contract to purchase standard accessories
from National Screen for resale in the Philadelphia area.' 3 Judgment of
dismissal with prejudice was then entered by stipulation of the parties. 14
In 1949, Lawlor brought a second action against the same defendants and
five other motion picture producers, alleging that the conspiracy had con-
tinued, 15 and that the other producer-defendants had joined the conspiracy
by signing exclusive distribution licenses with National Screen after the
1943 judgment was entered.' 6 The complaint demanded an injunction and
treble damages for the period 1943-1949.17
The Third Circuit ruled that the prior consent judgment barred Lawlor's
subsequent claims against all nine defendants.' 8 Noting that the subsequent
acts were done in furtherance of the original conspiracy and constituted
"essentially the same course of wrongful conduct" alleged in the prior action,
the court concluded that Lawlor's second suit was based upon the same
cause of action previously asserted, and was therefore barred by res judi-
cata.' 9 Moreover, the relationship between the defendants was "close enough"
to entitle the five motion picture producers not parties to the prior action
10. Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 1953 TR-A CAs. 1167,619, p. 68,951
(E.D. Pa. 1953).
11. Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 211 F.2d 934, 935 (3d Cir. 1954).
12. Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 1953 TRADE CAs. ff 67,619, p. 68,951
(E.D. Pa. 1953). The release covered only accrued claims. Brief for Appellants, p. 6,
Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 211 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1954).
13. Ibid.
The defendants argued that Lawlor was estopped by its adherence to the contract with
National Screen, Brief for Appellees, pp. 13-16, Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp.,
211 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1954), but this contention was never adjudicated. On the effect of
equitable defenses in private antitrust suits, see Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram
& Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (unclean hands) ; Note, 48 Nw. L. REv. 619 (1953).
14. Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 211 F.2d 934, 935 (3d Cir. 1954).
Lawlor's contention that its earlier suit was settled under duress was rejected both by
the district court and the Third Circuit. See Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp.,
1953 TRADE CAS. 1167,619, p. 68,954 (E.D. Pa. 1953), aff'd, 211 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1954).
But see Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647, 652-54 (2d Cir. 1945).
15. Id. at 935, 936-37.
16. Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 1953 TRADE CAs. 1167,619, p. 68,952
(E.D. Pa. 1953). See also Brief for Appellants, supra note 12, at 4-7.
17. Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 211 F.2d 934, 935 (3d Cir. 1954).
18. Id. at 936-37.
19. Id. at 934-36. The court nowhere made the statement that the same cause of
action was involved in the two actions. It did, however, state unequivocally that plaintiffs
could be barred only if they were "suing upon the 'same cause of action' as that upon




to the benefit of the judgment even though they were not in privity with the
original defendants.20
The phrase "essentially the same course of wrongful conduct" appears to
have been used in a remarkably broad sense. Although four of the 1949
defendants had been parties to the original conspiracy 2 ' and the exclusive
licenses and monopolized market were the same in both actions,22 five addi-
tional defendants had joined the conspiracy and thereby increased its market
power from approximately sixty-seven per cent in 1942 to almost one hundred
per cent in 19 4 9 .23 And while the principal charge in 1942 was that the
defendants' exclusive arrangements denied Lawlor access to normal sources
of supply of standard accessories, 24 the principal charge in 1949 was that
National Screen had deliberately made slow and erratic deliveries of acces-
sories under its contract with Lawlor, and that the defendants had used
tie-in sales and other means of exploiting their power in related markets to
monopolize the market for standard accessories.2 5 Furthermore, the ex-
clusive licenses and tie-in sales effected after 1943 were acts constituting in-
dependent violations of the antitrust laws, whether or not done pursuant to
the original conspiracy.2 6
20. Id. at 937.
21. Id. at 935.
22. Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 1953 TaDEn CAs. If 67,619, p. 68,952
(E.D. Pa. 1953).
23. Compare Complaint, para. 48, Allied Poster & Supply Corp. v. National Screen
Service Corp., Civil No. 2472 (E.D. Pa. 1942) (60-73% of national accessories market),
with Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 99 F. Supp. 180, 184 (E.D. Pa. 1951)
(virtually 100% market control). Thus, even if the 1943 judgment had represented a
determination that defendants' conduct was not illegal in view of their market position
at that time, it would not be controlling as to the legality of defendants' conduct in
1949. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 527-28 (1948); United
States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945).
Since Lawlor was decided on a motion to dismiss, it is proper to assume that the
allegations of the complaint were true. See Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korporation, 332
U.S. 480 (1947); Kingwood Oil Co. v. Bell, 204 F.2d 8 (7th Cir. 1953).
24. Complaint, paras. 34, 35, 46, Allied Poster & Supply Corp. v. National Screen
Service Corp., Civil No. 2472 (E.D. Pa. 1942). Price discrimination, use of exclusive
dealing contracts, monopolization, and conspiracy to monopolize were also charged in 1942.
Id., passim.
25. Amended Complaint, paras. 35-47, Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp.,
1953 TRADE CAs. If 67,619 (E.D. Pa. 1953). After the settlement agreement of 1943,
plaintiffs could buy standard accessories from National Screen, see note 13 mpra, but
National Screen retained exclusive control over the distribution of "specialty" accessories
and "trailers." Amended Complaint, supra, paras. 31, 39.
26. The five exclusive agreements signed after judgment were probably independent
violations of § 3 of the Clayton Act, United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California,
337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949), and might have amounted to violations of § 1 of the Sherman
Act, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1948), particular-
ly since defendants' market power had increased, United States v. United Shoe Ma-
chinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 343 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 346 U.S. 894
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The problem of determining whether res judicata precludes successive
actions for continued maintenance of the same condition has arisen in con-
nection with continuing nuisances. If the nuisance is "permanent," plaintiff's
past and future damages are immediately ascertainable, and must be re-
covered in a single action.27 Continued maintenance of a permanent nuisance
is not a legal wrong, since a nuisance is not "permanent" unless defendant
has a legal or equitable right to maintain the condition, once it is created,
or unless plaintiff chooses to treat the condition as permanent.28 If the nui-
sance is "temporary" or "abatable," however, a plaintiff may bring successive
actions for damages as they accrue.29 A fresh wrong is committed every
instant that the defendant continues to maintain the offending condition,
since the defendant is considered to have a continuing duty to abate the
nuisance.30 Lawlor treated a conspiracy as a "permanent" wrong which,
once attacked, could be continued with impunity. The court dismissed the
nuisance cases as too confused to be a helpful analogy.8 1 But the confusion
(1954). Individual tie-in sales constitute per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3
of the Clayton Act. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); cf.
Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 457
(1941). Therefore the fact that the "same" conspiracy was charged in both actions seems
immaterial, since plaintiffs need not have alleged conspiracy in order to state valid claims
against the defendants.
27. E.g., Missouri Pac. R.R. v. McGuire, 205 Ark. 658, 169 S.W.2d 872 (1943);
Stodghill v. The Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 53 Iowa 341, 5 N.W. 495 (1888); Bruton v.
Carolina Power & Light Co., 217 N.C. 1, 8-9, 6 S.E.2d 822, 826-27 (1940). See also
CLARK, CODE PLEADING 486-8 (2d ed. 1947); Goodrich, Permanent Structures and Con-
tinuing Injuries, the Iowa Rude, 4 IOWA L. BULL. 67 (1918) ; McCormick, Damages for
Anticipated Injury to Land, 37 HARv. L. REv. 574 (1924).
28. See Goodrich, supra note 27, at 79; McCormick, supra note 27, at 584-89; RE-
STATEMENT, TORTS §930 (1939). This rule, which centers about whether the nuisance
is enjoinable, is the better and more usual one. Under the minority rule, the test is
whether the nuisance is physically permanent, and no inquiry is made as to whether or
not it is legally abatable. See Troy v. Cheshire R.R., 23 N.H. 83 (1851); Powers v.
Council Bluffs, 45 Iowa 652 (1877) ; Goodrich, supra note 27, at 69-76.
Judgment in an action on a permanent nuisance confers upon the defendant a right
to continue to maintain the offending condition. See, e.g., Mansfield v. Tenney, 202
Mass. 312, 88 N.E. 892 (1909) ; Vanderslice v. Irondale Electric Light, Heat & Power
Co., 232 Pa. St. 435, 81 Ati. 445 (1911) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 930, comment c (1939).
29. Kelly v. Cape Girardeau, 338 Mo. 103, 89 S.W.2d 41 (1935) (abatable) ; City of
Holdenville v. Kiser, 195 Okla. 189, 156 P.2d 363 (1945) (temporary) ; Nelson v. Con-
solidated Sand & Stone Co., 66 S.D. 357, 283 N.W. 164 (1938) ("recurrent"). See also
secondary sources cited note 27 supra. The offending condition is temporary if it is not
one which will continue indefinitely, so that prospective damages cannot be assessed with
accuracy. It is abatable if it is a condition which could be enjoined at plaintiff's instance.
In both types of cases, successive actions may be brought for damages as they accrue.
See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 930, comments a, b (1939).
30. Kelly v. Cape Girardeau, 338 Mo. 103, 89 S.W.2d 41 (1935); Nelson v. Con-
solidated Sand & Stone Co., 66 S.D. 357, 283 N.W. 164 (1939) ; Nashville v. Comer, 88
Tenn. 415, 12 S.W. 1027 (1890). See also McCormick, supra note 27, at 593.
31. Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 211. F.2d 934, 936 (3d Cir. 1954). An-
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in nuisance cases has arisen in determining whether a particular condition
was "permanent" or "abatable," 32 not as to whether successive actions could
be brought for an admittedly wrongful course of conduct pursued after judg-
ment.-3 Violations of the antitrust laws are explicitly declared "abatable"
by statute.34 And continued participation in a conspiracy after judgment is
a new offense which will support a separate indictment and conviction.3 5
A cause of action has been defined as "the operative facts"3 0 constituting
the basis for the claim or demand, or alternatively as "the legal wrong which
the facts show." 37 All the operative facts constituting the legal wrongs
alleged in Lawlor's 1949 complaint came into existence after the 1943 judg-
ment, and therefore could not have been advanced as grounds for relief in
the earlier action.38 Moreover, none of the relief sought in 1949 was claimed
for the defendants' conduct prior to 1943.39 The Third Circuit thus appeared
other analogy which the court might have considered is that of the installment
contract. Where a partial breach of contract is accompanied by a repudiation, plaintiff
may bring only one action for damages in many jurisdictions. E.g., Palms v. Hollings-
head, 184 N.Y. 211, 77 N.E. 40 (1906); Chapman v. Potomac Chemical Co., 159 F.2d
459 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Smith & Gottlieb, Inc. v. Cheatham, 31 A.2d 676 (D.C. Mun. Ct.
App. 1942); CLARK, CODE PLEADING 472-79 (2d ed. 1947); Comment, 64 YA.E UJ. 85,
114-18 (1954). Where there is no effective repudiation, defendant remains under a duty
to carry out the contract, and subsequent actions will lie for subsequent breaches. See
4 CoRBNs, CONTRAcrs § 954 (1951) ; Bennett, The Modern Lease-An Estate it: Land or
a Contract, 16 TEx. L. REv. 47 (1938). The contract analogy, like the nuisance analogy,
would lead to the conclusion that successive actions should be permitted, since defendant
could hardly be considered to have repudiated his future obligations to plaintiff under the
antitrust laws.
32. See note 27 supra.
33. In cases where a nuisance is created by illegal activity, or the wrongful or
negligent maintenance of a lawful structure, the nuisance is always "abatable." See Uline
v. New York Cent. & H.R.R., 101 N.Y. 98, 4 N.E. 536 (1886); Milan v. Bethlehem,
372 Pa. 598, 94 A.2d 774 (1953) ; Bartlett v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 92 N. Va. 445, 115
S.E. 451 (1922). See Annot., 1916E L.RLA. 997, 1013-42 (1916).
34. Clayton Act §16, 38 STAT. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §26 (1952).
35. United States v. Swift, 186 Fed. 1002 (N.D. Ill. 1911).
36. See CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 19 (2d ed. 1947); 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PnAcncEl 378
(2d ed. 1948). Other definitions of a cause of action, see generally CLARK, op. cit. Mipra,
at 476-78; Developnents in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HAnv. L REv. 818, 824-31 (1952),
are narrower than the above definition, and would therefore support a fortiori the argu-
ment advanced in text.
37. Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316 (1927). See also American Fire
& Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 13 (1951).
38. See text at notes 15-17 supra. Although Lawlor in his second complaint alleged
certain facts in existence prior to 1943, such as the signing of the original contracts, the
operative facts centered about defendants' continued adherence to those contracts after
judgment. Amended Complaint, paras. 48-50, Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp.,
1953 TRADE CAs. 67,619 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
39. To the extent that plaintiffs' injuries suffered after judgment were attributable
exclusively to events occurring before judgment, damages presumably could not be re-
covered in the second action. REsTATE::ENT, JUDGaIETS § 62 (1942).
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to find the causes of action identical in the two suits merely because of the
similarity of legal issues presented.40
The definition of cause of action implicit in Lawlor is not erroneous merely
because it departs substantially from prior definitions. Courts have long
recognized that a single verbal formula may not be adequate in all cases, 41
and that they must determine the extent of a cause of action pragmatically,
having regard to the purpose served by the concept in different situations. 2
The policy underlying res judicata is to compel litigants to adopt efficient
procedural means of seeking relief to which the substantive law may entitle
them.4 3 Lawlor goes far beyond the requirements of this policy, and extin-
guishes claims which did not even exist at the time of the prior action.
The court's failure to perceive that res judicata can bar only claims which
should have been presented in a previous action led to its ruling that the
prior judgment barred Lawlor's claims against the five producers not parties
to the original suit.44 Those defendants could not possibly have been joined
in the prior action, since they did not enter the conspiracy until after judg-
ment was rendered.4 5 Under Lawlor, a plaintiff may lose claims he had no
reason to know would ever exist, against persons who were total strangers
to his original action. But the holding in Lawlor would be open to question
even if the five defendants could have been made parties in the prior action:
there is no privity between joint wrongdoers, and res judicata has never
40. 211 F.2d 934, 936 (3d Cir. 1954). The court admitted that similarity of legal
issues was not an adequate test for res judicata where the action was based on a single
isolated tort, ibid., but where the legal issues are presented by a continuing course of
conduct, it would apparently require only that the conduct be "essentially the same."
See notes 21-26 supra, and accompanying text.
41. E.g., United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1933);
American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 12 (1951). See CLAuK, Con PLEADING
137 (2d ed. 1947) ; 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAIC'cE 119 (Cum. Supp. 1942).
42. United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62 (1933), discussed In
Arnold, The Code "Cause of ActioW' Clarified by United States Supreme Court, 19
A.B.A.J. 215 (1933) passim; CLARK, op. cit. supra note 41, at 137.
43. See, generally, CLARK, CODE PLEADING 477 (2d ed. 1947) (trial convenience);
4 CORBIN, CoNTRActs § 955 (1951) ; cf. Schopflocher, What Is a Single Cause of Action
for the Purpose of the Doctrine of Res Judicata?, 21 ORE. L. REv. 319, 364 (1942).
Courts are ordinarily content to say that a judgment is conclusive as to every matter
that was or should have been litigated in the prior action. See, e.g., Cromwell v. County
of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876) ; Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320
U.S. 661. (1944) ; Baker v. Moody, 204 F.2d 918 (5th Cir. 1953). See also 1 Mooar,
FEDERAL PRAcTicE 116 (Cum. Supp. 1942).
44. See text at notes 18, 20 supra.
45. See text at note "I6 supra. In the 1942 action, Lawlor alleged that National
Screen had attempted to negotiate similar contracts with four of the five producers joined
as additional defendants in the 1949 action, but no contracts were signed with these pro-
ducers until some time after the 1943 judgment was rendered. Ibid.; Lawlor v. National
Screen Service Corp., 1953 TRADE GAs. 67,619, p. 68,952 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
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previously interfered with a plaintiff's right to sue them severally rather than
jointly.40
The Third Circuit's definition of cause of action in terms of similarity of
legal issues is unfortunate because res judicata operates without regard to
how legal issues were resolved in a prior action, or whether they were re-
solved at all, so long as judgment was "on the merits."' ' 7 A judgment
rendered in favor of either party on any but procedural grounds, including
a consent judgment, is "on the merits."4' s Under Lawlor, a plaintiff who
proved that a defendant was violating the antitrust laws, but was denied
judgment because of failure to prove damages or causation,40 would lose not
only his accrued claims, but also any right to legal redress for wrongs done
him thereafter by the defendant pursuant to the same course of conduct.Go
46. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper 2f. & S. Co., 225 U.S. 111, 132 (1912) ; Bomar
v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 1947); CLARK, CoDE P.EAInG 376 (2d ed. 1947);
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 94, comment b (1942).
Both the district and circuit courts in Lawlor appear to have confused res judicata
and collateral estoppel in connection with the ruling as to parties. Some courts have
relaxed the requirement of privity in collateral estoppel cases. See, e.g., Bruszewski v.
United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1950); Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del.
124, 172 Atl. 260 (1934). Relaxation of the requirement of privity even in collateral
estoppel cases has been criticized. See 1 MOORE, FEDERAL Prn, Ticm § 2.047 (Cum. Supp.
1942) ; Seavey, Res Jdicata with Reference to Persons Neither Parties nor Przies, 57
HARv. L. REv. 98 (1943). Extension of this doctrine to res judicata has apparently never
even been advocated. See CLARK, op. cit. snpra, at 479; but cf. 68 HaRv. L. REv. 377, 379
(1954). Lawlor in effect makes joinder of defendants compulsory, since apparently a judg-
ment for or against any of them would extinguish claims against the rest. But see FED. R.
Civ. P. 19(a) (joinder required only for indispensable parties). The five new defendants
in Lawlor were not indispensable to the 1942 action. See Wyoga Gas & Oil Corp. v.
Schrack, 27 F. Supp. 35, aff'd on reargunient, 29 F. Supp. 582 (M.D. Pa. 1939) ; 3 Mcorm,
FEDERAL PRAcncE 2153 (2d ed. 1948).
47. E.g., Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191 (1932) (judgment for plaintiff); Baltimore
S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316 (1927) (same); United States v. California & Oregon
Land Co., 192 U.S. 355 (1904) (judgment for defendant) ; Williamson v. Columbia Gas
& Electric Corp., 186 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 921 (1951) (Same) ;
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 45 (1942). See also American National Bank & Trust Co.
v. United States, 142 F.2d 571 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (dismissal for failure of prosecution is
"on the merits" for purposes of res judicata) ; Van Brode Milling Co. v. Kellogg Co., 113
F. Supp. 845 (D. Del. 1953) (same).
48. Id. § 49, comment a. A consent judgment is "on the merits" for purposes of res
judicata. Urbino v. Puerto Rico Ry. Light & Power Co., 164 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1947).
Under FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b), any involuntary dismissal on grounds other than lack of
jurisdiction or improper venue acts as an adjudication upon the merits, unless the court
otherwise specifies in its order.
49. See, e.g., Ring v. Authors' League of America, Inc., 186 F2d 637 (2d Cir. 1951);
Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 190 F.2d 561, 568 (7th Cir. 1951).
50. Lawlor will affect primarily those plaintiffs who have suffered an adverse judg-
ment, since ordinarily a successful plaintiff would obtain an injunction, and could initiate
civil contempt proceedings if defendant continued the same illegal course of conduct.
See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO-Radio Pictures, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 250 (N.D. Ill. 1948), aff'd,
170 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1948).
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Presumably even a plaintiff who was awarded damages but failed to obtain
an injunction would be helpless thereafter if defendant continued his illegal
conduct.51 And plaintiffs who have entered consent judgments after com-
promising only accrued claims, on the assumption that the antitrust laws
would provide a remedy for future violations, have inadvertently compromised
more than they intended. 52
The interest of individual litigants and the public in preventing vexatious
litigation arising from continuing conduct is not protected by res judicata
alone. Where an essential issue of fact, or mixed fact and law, has been
actually litigated and resolved against the plaintiff in a prior action, subse-
quent actions based upon an identical course of conduct by the defendants
may be precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.5 3 Thus, if a court
has once determined that a defendant's continuing conduct is not unlaw-
ful, subsequent actions by the same plaintiff will be barred.5 4 Subsequent
51. A valid, final judgment on the merits awarding damages would extinguish the
plaintiff's entire cause of action. 2 FxEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 546 (5th ed. 1925) ; ReSTA'r-
MENT, JUDGMENTS § 47 (1942). In order to obtain an injunction, a private plaintiff must
prove that there is a "'dangerous probability' of a repetition of the wrong to him iu-
dividually." Ring v. Authors' League of America, Inc., 186 F.2d 637, 643 (2d Cir. 1951).
A plaintiff might be awarded damages but denied an injunction because the threat of
future conduct was not imminent enough, or did not endanger him individually, and
then, under the Lawlor rule, be denied relief for injury caused by an actual repetition of
illegal conduct by defendant. See, contra, Fort Worth Stockyards Co. v. Brown,
161 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) (prior judgment denying injunction no bar to
later action alleging subsequent acts) ; Wilcher v. Sharpe, 236 N.C. 308, 312, 72 S.E.2d
662, 665 (1952) (dictum to same effect); RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 54 (1942). In
such circumstances a plaintiff might be able to persuade the court to reopen and modify
its former judgment pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). See Note, 61 YALE L.J. 76 (1952),
52. Litigants who wish to settle out of court in the future may be able to avoid the
effect Lawlor gives to consent judgments by drafting appropriate settlement agreements.
Lawlor would probably not preclude a plaintiff from bringing an action for breach of a
settlement agreement in which defendant contracted to refrain from engaging in specified
similar practices in the future. Moreover, plaintiff could require defendant to contract
not to plead the judgment as a bar to actions charging subsequent violations, since res
judicata is a waivable defense. See Riordan v. Ferguson, 147 F.2d 983, 987 (2d Cir.
1945); Hill v. Huron, 39 S.D. 530, 165 N.W. 534 (1917). But see von Moselzisker,
Res Judicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299, 316 (1929).
53. Collateral estoppel makes the decision of a court conclusive in subsequent actions
upon the issues actually litigated and necessarily determined, whether or not the same
cause of action is involved. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876) ; Partmar
Corp. v. Paramount Pictures Theatres Corp., 347 U.S. 89 (1954). On collateral estop-
pel generally, see 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 689 (5th ed. 1925); 1 MooRE, FEDERAL
P.AcrIc, § 2.048 (Cum. Supp. 1942) ; Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgmnt, 56 I-IARv,
L REv. 1 (1942). See 68 HARv. L. REv. 377 (1954).
54. See Florasynth Laboratories, Inc. v. Goldberg, 191 F.2d 877 (7th Cir. 1951)
(assuming that continued use of tradename by defendant after judgment gave plaintiff
new cause of action, prior holding that purchasers would not be misled was conclusive
under collateral estoppel) ; Straus v. American Publishers' Ass'n, 201 Fed. 306 (2d Cir.
1912) (judgment conclusive in subsequent antitrust action on issue of legality of de-
fendants' continuing activity); Bodeneck v. Cater's Motor Freight System, Inc., 198
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actions against third parties may be simplified by the doctrine of stare
decisis -5 or precluded by collateral estoppel " where the issues involved
have once been litigated and judicially determined against the plaintiff. But
the prior judgment in Lawlor, since it was entered by consent, determined
no issues either of law or fact.57 Although the court recognized that for this
reason a consent judgment could have no effect as collateral estoppel,0 it
nevertheless made this purely formal judgment conclusive as to issues which
were neither litigated nor determined.
The decision in Lawlor might seem less objectionable if considered as an
extension of res judicata applicable to those cases where plaintiff had an
opportunity to litigate not only the legality of a defendant's prior conduct, but
also his right to continue that conduct in the future5 2 Since the plaintiff could
have obtained injunctive relief as well as damages in his first action, the
public interest in minimizing litigation might seem to justify restricting him
to that single opportunity to settle all his claims, both accrued and prospec-
tive.60 Where an injured plaintiff's rights are freely alienable, as in cases
involving nuisance or trespass to land, application of Lawlor might be rea-
sonable where a plaintiff voluntarily relinquished his claims to future relief."'
Wash. 21, 86 P.2d 766 (1939) (complaint alleging acts by defendant subsequent to judg-
ment stated new cause of action, but prior determination that such acts did not con-
stitute a nuisance was conclusive). But cf. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 601-
02 (1948).
55. See 1 MfoosR, FEn.AL PAcric § 2.042 (Cur. Supp. 1942). The doctrine of stare
decisis does not depend on res judicata, and accordingly does not require identity of parties.
Jaffe v. FTC, 123 F.2d 814 (7th Cir. 1941). A plaintiff who lost a previous case involving
the same subject matter on a ruling of law would often be vulnerable to a motion to dismiss
or for summary judgment in a later action against a third party. See discussion in CL~n1,
CODF P.FA ING 554-57, 561 (2d ed. 1947).
56. See authorities cited note 46 supra.
57. A consent judgment has no effect as collateral estoppel, e.g., United States v.
International Building Co., 345 U.S. 502 (1953), or as stare decisis, Platt v. Wagner,
347 Pa. 27, 31 A.2d 499 (1943).
A consent judgment should be distinguished from a consent decree, which is a judi-
cially approved agreement between the contending parties, Swift & Co. v. United States,
276 U.S. 311 (1928), and from a judgment entered upon stipulated facts, which is fully
effective as a pronouncement of law by the court, Kelly v. Town of Milan, 21 Fed. 842,
862-63 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1884) (dictum), aff'd on other grounds, 127 U.S. 139 (188);
cf. Florasynth Laboratories, Inc. v. Goldberg, 191 F.2d 877, SSO (7th Cir. 1951) (motion
to dismiss).
58. Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 211 F.?d 934, 935 (3d Cir. 1954).
59. See Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 1953 T=.E CAs. ff67,619, p. 63,953
(E.D. Pa. 1953).
60. Since an injunction may be denied after actual litigation for reasons irrelevant to
a future suit, see note 51 supra, the above policy would seem to be limited to those cases
where plaintiff failed to utilize a previous opportunity to obtain prospective relief, as where
he compromised his claim for injunction and dismissed his action with prejudice, or where
he neglected to make such a claim. But the fairness and effectiveness of this rule are open
to serious question in any case. See notes 65 and 66 infra, and accompanying text
61. In Hahl v. Sugo, 169 N.Y. 109, 62 N.E. 135 (1901), plaintiff's action to enjoin
a continuing trespass was held barred by a prior favorable judgment in an action where
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In private antitrust suits, however, allowing waiver of future claims cannot
be justified, since it would enable defendants to achieve partial immunity
from the antitrust laws. The private antitrust suit was created as a means
of public law enforcement . 2 A release purporting to absolve a defendant
from liability for future violations of the antitrust laws, whether or not
accompanied by a settlement of future damage claims, would almost certainly
be held void as against public policy.0 3 Under Lawlor the same result could
be achieved by the simple expedient of filing a complaint and causing it to
be dismissed with prejudice.6 4 In cases where a plaintiff's continued com-
mercial existence is dependent upon cessation of a defendant's illegal conduct,
Lawlor might provide an additional incentive to a plaintiff to refuse settle-
ment and pursue his claim to injunctive relief, thus perhaps furthering anti-
no injunctive relief was claimed. See also CLARK, CODE PLEADINa 475 n.151 (2d ed.
1947) ; 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAc'ncE 388-93 (2d ed. 1948). For a contrary view, see Cleary,
Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339 (1948) passim. The rule suggested might also
be applied in patent and trademark infringement cases, since no public policy forbids alien-
ation of rights in such property. Cf. Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Cooper, 156 F.2d
483, 485 (2d Cir. 1946) (dictum) ; Bresnick v. United States Vitamin Corp., 139 F.2d 239,
242 (2d Cir. 1943) (same).
62. See Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-52 (1947);
Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 214 F.2d 891, 893 (5th Cir. 1954);
Maltz v. San, 134 F.2d 2, 4 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 772 (1943). See also
HAIILTON & TILL, ANTrRUST IN AcrIoN 10 (TNEC Monograph 16, 1940); Testimony
of H. Graham Morison, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power
of tize House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 3408, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1951).
63. Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Mansville Corp., 39 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.
N.Y. 1941) (dictum); cf. Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S.
394, 402 (1947) (covenant not to contest validity of patent unenforceable) ; The Ansaldo
San Giorgio I v. Rheinstrom Bros. Co., 294 U.S. 494 (1935) (release in advance of carrier's
liability for negligent injury to cargo ineffective). See also 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTs
§ 1652 rL8 (rev. ed. 1937) ; 2 id. § 413 n.5; 103 U. PA. L. Rav. 273 (1954).
64. See 103 U. PA. L. Rv. 273 (1954).
Almost no restriction is imposed upon the right to dismiss an action with preju-
dice under FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a) (1) (ii), if all parties to the action consent. See gen-
erally 5 MooaE, FEDERAL PRAtcaTc- 1007-17 (2d ed. 1951). The right to dismiss "without
prejudice" is limited by FED. R. Civ. P. 41. in order to avoid harassment of defendants,
see Note, 63 YALE L.J. 738 (1954), since a dismissal without prejudice does not prevent
the bringing of subsequent actions on the same claim. Morse v. Bragg, 107 F.2d 648,
649 (D.C. Cir. 1939) ; Williams v. Mid-South Paving Co., 200 Miss. 103, 25 So. 2d 792,
798 (1946). "With prejudice" means simply that the dismissal is intended to be effective
as res judicata. Harris v. Moye's Estate, 211. Ark. 765, 202 S.W.2d 360 (1947) ; May-
flower Industries v. Thor Corp., 17 N.J. Super. 505, 86 A.2d 293, 296 (1952).
If the parties specifically agreed to waive future claims arising under the antitrust
laws, the consent judgment might be ineffective: courts have frequently held that a con-
sent judgment based upon an agreement that the parties had no power to make is not
effective as res judicata. See Kelly v. Town of Milan, 127 U.S. 139 (1888); West v. Bank
of Commerce & Trusts, 167 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1948). But cf. Urbino v. Puerto Rico Ry.
Light & Power Co., 164 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1947).
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trust enforcement.65 However, it seems far more likely that Lawlor yill trap
unwary plaintiffs and enable monopolists to evade private enforcement of the
law.€6 The Supreme Court, on certiorari, should reverse Lawlor and remand
the case for consideration of the merits of the parties' claims.0 7
65. By giving broad prospective effect to consent judgments, La-lor might encour-
age litigation in these cases. An injunction is more likely to protect the public interest
than a settlement agreement negotiated by the parties with a view to protecting their
own interests. But see note 52 supra. A better way to protect the public interest in
private antitrust cases would be to require court approval of settlements, as is done in
the case of class or representative suits and qui tam actions. See 3 Moon=, FEDAL
PRAicE 3551-60 (2d ed. 1948); McLaughlin, Capacity of Plaintiff-Stocbholder to
Terminate a Stockholder's Suit, 46 Yi.n LJ. 421) 425, 432-35 (1937). See also In-
former's Act §4, 12 STAT. 698 (1863), 31 U.S.C. §232(b) (1952).
66. Evasion of private enforcement might as a practical matter amount to freedom
to violate the antitrust laws with impunity, since the enforcement agencies of the federal
government can prosecute only a fraction of the violations reported due to lack of
adequate appropriations. See Antitrust Law Enforcement by the Federal Tradc Com-
mission and the Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, H.LT REP'. No. 3235, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 75-76 (1951); Testimony of H. Graham Morison, Hearings, sipra note
62, at 15.
67. Lawlor's petition for certiorari was granted October 14, 1954. 75 Sup. Ct. 42
(1954).
The merits of the case were previously considered on Lawlor's motion for summary
judgment in 1951. See Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 99 F. Supp. 10 (E.D.
Pa. 1951). The district court granted the motion in part, holding that National Screen's
exclusive agreements were unlawful per se, but that the conspiracy charge against the
other eight defendants had not been established. No final order was ever entered because
of the difficulty of framing a decree against only one of the defendants. Brief for Appel-
lants, p. 9, Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 211 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1954). The
1951 opinion noted the existence of the former judgment, but did not discuss res judicata,
which was first raised by defendants in 1953. Ibid.
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